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Infections with low pathogenicity and highly pathogenic 
avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses affected poultry in 4 states 
in the southeastern United States in 2017. We evaluated 
pathogenicity and transmission of representative viruses in 
mouse and ferret models and examined replication kinetics 
in human respiratory tract cells. These viruses can cause 
respiratory infections in mammalian models. 
Influenza A viruses have been associated with sporadic influenza outbreaks in commercial poultry throughout 
North America, typically due to low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI) H5 and H7 subtype viruses (1). Recent 
emergence and spread of highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza (HPAI) H7N3 and H7N8 subtype viruses in North 
America have underscored the capability of LPAI viruses 
to mutate into HPAI viruses and cause devastating losses 
to domestic poultry (2). Spread of avian influenza viruses 
in waterfowl flyways in North America, especially those 
over areas of dense commercial poultry operations, neces-
sitates constant surveillance and study (3). Because these 
viruses are reportable to the World Organisation for Ani-
mal Health, detection of these subtypes also has a major 
role in trade of commercial poultry products (4).
The Study
In March 2017, outbreaks of infection with HPAI H7N9 
subtype virus were reported on 2 commercial broiler 
breeder farms in Lincoln County, Tennessee, USA. LPAI 
H7N9 subtype virus was concurrently and subsequently 
reported in commercial and backyard producer farms in 
Tennessee, Alabama, Kentucky, and Georgia (5,6). More 
than 270,000 birds died or were culled; no human cases 
were reported. Similar to previous epornitics of LPAI 
H7N9 subtype virus in Kentucky, Minnesota, and Ne-
braska in recent years, viruses isolated in Tennessee in 
2017 were of the North American wild bird lineage and 
genetically and phenotypically distinct from the Asian 
lineage of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus circulating in 
China (6,7). 
This study was approved by the Institutional Animal 
Care and Use Committee of the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention. We examined in 2 mammalian models 
the pathogenicity and transmissibility of LPAI and HPAI 
H7N9 subtype viruses isolated from chickens in Tennes-
see (ck/TN) and evaluated the capacity for these viruses 
to replicate in a representative human respiratory cell line. 
H7N9 isolates A/ck/TN/17-007147-2/2017 (HPAI) and A/
ck/TN/17-007431-3/2017 (LPAI) differ by a 9-aa insertion 
in the hemagglutinin gene and 18 additional amino acids 
throughout the genome (5,6).
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Table. Infection of mice and ferrets with influenza A(H7N9) ck/TN 
viruses, Tennessee, USA, 2017* 
Characteristic LPAI HPAI 
Mice†   
 Weight loss‡ 1.7 2.3 
 Virus titer§   
  106 lung, day 3 pi 4.3 ± 1.1 <1.5 
  103 lung, day 3 pi 2.8 (1/3) <1.5 
  106 lung, day 6 pi 5.6 ± 2.1 <1.5 
  103 lung, day 6 pi <1.5 <1.5 
Ferrets, days 1–10 pi¶   
 Weight loss‡ 3.1 4.6 
 Fever# 1.2 0.6 
 Virus in rectal swab specimen** 2/3 1/3 
 Virus titer at day 3 pi§   
  Nasal wash 4.9 ± 0.5 3.6 ± 0.9 
  Nasal turbinates 5.8 ± 0.6 4.8 ± 0.8 
  Trachea 3.5 ± 0.4 (2/3) <1.5 
  Lung <1.5 <1.5 
  Olfactory bulb 3.8 (1/3) <1.5 
  Brain <1.5 <1.5 
  Intestine <1.5 <1.5 
*EID50, 50% egg infectious dose; HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza 
virus; LPAI, low pathogenicity avian influenza virus; pi, postinoculation. 
†Mice were 8 weeks of age and inoculated intranasally with 106 EID50 or 
103 EID50 of virus in a volume of 50 L. 
‡Percent mean maximum weight loss after inoculation with 106 EID50 of 
virus (days 2–10 pi). 
§Virus titers are expressed as mean ± SD log10 EID50/mL for animals with 
positive virus detection (n = 3 unless otherwise denoted in parentheses). 
Inoculation dose was 106 EID50 (mice and ferrets) or 103 EID50 (mice). The 
limit of virus detection was 101.5 EID50/mL. 
¶Ferrets were 7 mo of age, serologically negative for currently circulating 
viruses by hemagglutinin inhibition assay, and inoculated intranasally with 
1 mL of virus. 
#Mean maximum increase in body temperature (baseline body 
temperature range 38.1C–38.9°C). 
**No. ferrets with detectable virus in rectal swab specimens collected on 
days 1, 3, and 5 pi/total no. ferrets tested. 
 
DISPATCHES
150 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 24, No. 1, January 2018
Previous investigations of H7 subtype virus pairs dis-
playing varied pathogenicity in poultry have shown differ-
ential phenotypes in mice, ranging from mild to moderate 
infection, which was indistinguishable between HPAI and 
LPAI viruses (H7N3 subtype isolates from Chile in 2002 
and British Columbia, Canada, in 2004), and severe in-
fection with HPAI, but not LPAI, viruses (H7N8 subtype 
isolates from Indiana, USA, in 2016) (8,9). Among LPAI 
or HPAI ck/TN viruses, inoculated BALB/c mice showed 
mild illness (weight loss <3%) and no deaths (Table). Al-
though LPAI virus replicated to moderate titers in lungs 
of mice after high-dose inoculation, HPAI virus was not 
detected. Infectious virus was not detected in the nose or 
brain of any mouse.
To examine virulence of ck/TN viruses in a mam-
malian species with closer physiologic similarity to hu-
mans, ferrets were inoculated with LPAI or HPAI vi-
ruses. Both viruses caused mild infection (<5% mean 
maximum weight loss; Table) without sustained lethargy, 
sneezing/nasal discharge, or high fever. LPAI and HPAI 
viruses were restricted to the upper respiratory tract of 
ferrets, and no infectious virus was detected in lungs. 
Both viruses were detected in nasal turbinates of all in-
oculated ferrets, and LPAI virus was also detected in the 
trachea of 2/3 ferrets and the olfactory bulb of 1/3 fer-
rets. Low virus titers were detected in rectal swab speci-
mens (Table) but not in intestinal tissue or ocular samples 
(conjunctival washes and eye and conjunctiva tissue). 
Figure 1. Transmission of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus ck/TN between ferrets in direct contact, Tennessee, USA, 2017. Three ferrets 
were inoculated with 106 EID50 of A) low pathogenicity avian influenza virus or B) highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, and nasal 
washes were collected from each ferret on the indicated days postinoculation (left bars) to assess viral replication. An immunologically 
naive ferret was placed in the same cage as each inoculated ferret at 24 h postinoculation, and nasal washes were collected from each 
contact ferret on the indicated days postcontact. Bars indicate individual ferrets. All ferrets were serologically negative for circulating 
influenza viruses at the start of the study. The limit of virus detection was 101.5 EID50/mL. EID50, 50% egg infectious dose.
Figure 2. Replication kinetics of avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses in human respiratory tract cells, Tennessee, USA, 2017, compared 
with strains from Nebraska (gs/NE) and Asia (Anhui/1). Calu-3 cells (American Type Culture Collection, Manassas, VA, USA) were 
grown to confluence in 12-mm–diameter transwell inserts (Corning, Corning, NY, USA), infected apically with viruses shown at a 
multiplicity of infection of 0.01 (A and C) or 0.001 (B) 1 h, washed, and incubated at 37°C (A and B) or 33°C (C). Supernatants were 
removed at indicated times postinoculation, and titers of infectious virus were determined by titration in eggs. The limit of virus detection 
was 101.5 EID50/mL. Values are mean from triplicate independent cultures per virus. Error bars indicate SDs. *p<0.05 for HPAI vs. LPAI 
ck/TN viruses by 2-way analysis of variance with a Tukey posttest. EID50, 50% egg infectious dose; gs, goose; HPAI, highly pathogenic 
avian influenza virus; LPAI, low pathogenicity avian influenza virus.
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These findings indicate that HPAI and LPAI ck/TN viruses 
have mild virulence for 2 mammalian species.
Selected HPAI and LPAI H7 subtype influenza viruses 
from North America have the capacity to be transmitted be-
tween ferrets when the animals are placed in close contact 
(10). However, the transmissibility of ck/TN H7N9 viruses 
was not known. Ferrets inoculated with LPAI and HPAI 
ck/TN viruses shed virus in nasal wash specimens through 
days 5–7 postinfection and showed seroconversion to ho-
mologous virus (Figure 1). HPAI virus was not transmitted 
to immunologically naive cage mates, because all contact 
ferrets remained seronegative at the end of the study. How-
ever, 1/3 LPAI virus contact ferrets shed virus to titers >104 
50% egg infectious dose/mL and seroconverted to homolo-
gous virus, which demonstrated a limited capacity for virus 
transmission in this model.
To determine if the growth advantage of LPAI virus 
in mice and ferrets was maintained in human cells, we 
compared replication kinetics of HPAI and LPAI ck/TN 
viruses in a human bronchial epithelial cell line (Calu-
3). Although both viruses replicated to high titers (>107 
50% egg infectious dose/mL) at a multiplicity of infec-
tion of 0.01 or 0.001 (Figure 2, panels A, B), LPAI virus 
replicated to a significantly higher titer than HPAI virus 
at either multiplicity of infection or culture temperature 
tested (p<0.05; Figure 2), despite showing a temperature 
sensitivity at 33°C, which was similar to that for other 
avian influenza viruses (11). Virus titers for LPAI ck/TN 
virus were significantly higher than those for a previously 
studied LPAI H7N9 virus from North America (A/goose/
Nebraska/17097-4/2011) 24–72 h postinfection at 37°C 
(p<0.05), but were reduced compared with the Asian 
lineage H7N9 subtype A/Anhui/1/2013 virus (Figure 2, 
panel A).
Conclusions
Detection of HPAI and LPAI H7 viruses in the United 
States represents a threat to commercial poultry activities 
and avian health. Limited transmission in a direct contact 
setting of LPAI (but not HPAI) ck/TN virus is similar to 
virus transmission of LPAI H7N8 and H7N2 subtype vi-
ruses (8,10), and suggests that influenza A(H7N9) viruses 
isolated in the United States in 2017 represent a low threat 
for human health in their current form. However, the ability 
of H7 subtype viruses in North America to acquire genetic 
insertions at the hemagglutinin cleavage site after recombi-
nation with host RNA (12,13) and their potential to acquire 
mutations associated with mammalian adaptation and viru-
lence underscores the need to monitor birds for LPAI H7 
viruses. This monitoring is especially needed in and around 
regions with wild bird flyways and high density of poultry 
because these viruses can rapidly and sporadically mutate 
to become HPAI viruses (3).
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